Archive for September 2008
How Much Blame To Throw At the CRA?
Some experts and some non-experts have pointed a finger at the Community Reinvestment Act as part of the reason behind the housing bubble bursting and setting off an economic crisis. I afforded it due consideration, but when all is said and done holds minimal blame in the grand scheme.
The failures in government regulation undoubtedly played a part in the economic crisis. However, compared to other government action, the CRA accounts for a tiny share of the pie in more ways then one. It was a mistake to change CRA compliance requirements to be measured on a quantitative basis and away from a qualitative value judgement. This forced lending institutions to require meet an annual lending quota or risk jeopardizing government benefits. The CRA most definitely encouraged lending to those who could not afford.
But looking at the percentage what the government qualified as CRA loans pales in comparison to the total share of outstanding subprime loans. Between 1993 and 1998, only $467 billion dollars qualified as CRA loans – a tiny slice of the trillions and trillions of dollars in outstanding home loan mortgages. Present day estimates indicate that CRA home mortgages only account for about 20% of all home mortgage loans. Even taking into account the higher default rates of subprime loans, a 9% default rate on CRA loans doesn’t even begin to approach the aggregate value in total defaulted home mortgages.
Numbers aside, it’s questionable whether or not a repeal of the CRA would have stopped the subprime lending spree. In fact, two other government actions greatly encouraged subprime mortgage practices far more then the CRA.
Combined, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae has either bought up or issued nearly half of all outstanding home mortgages by buying up loans from other lending institutions. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were able to begin buying up large amounts of outstanding home loans because they could now sell mortgage backed securities. Prior to the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act(which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act), banks were prohibited from offering investment services. But now Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and all banks could begin leveraging their outstanding home mortgage loans to raise additional capitol.
It was a new way to raise capitol revenue and a new way to increase profits. It’s natural for all businesses to exploit their profit margins while managing risks. However, the risks of mortgage backed securities were lessened by the nonbinding understanding in the financial sector that the government implicitly guaranteed the securities issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The federal government has long provided these two instutitions with tax breaks, subsidies, low interest loans, and a reduction in capitol backing regulations.
Believing the mortgage backed securities issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae would always be liquid, believed, to some degree, that the risk of subprime lending were offset by the implicit government backing. With the ability to leverage loans as capitol and the perceived invunrability of Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae, fueled an increase in subprime lending. It was a fantastic short term way to spur growth in the housing market, but miscalculated the risk involved based on assumptions. It was not the need to meet CRA requirements that caused banks to make high-risk loans, it was the incentive to raise capitol. The CRA could have been nonexistent and lending institutions would have still pursued those avenues which appeared profitable.
Government missteps played a role in where we are today. Banks should have never been allowed to enter the investment market through government deregulation. And the government never should have allowed Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae become the lynch pin in the home mortgage market.
Instead of pointing our finger at a single, politically self-serving source lets all grow 90 more fingers, so we can point the blame in all directions where it rightly deserves to be. This wasn’t the CRA’s doing. This was a confluence of events ranging from government to free market to populace none of which are to be used to gain the political upperhand.
Playing The Wrong Kind of Politics Dooms The Bailout Package
Question. What kind of recipe do you get when you have a Congressional election year, a financial crisis, and misinformed voter anger? A recipe for disaster.
And now our politicians in Washington are, for all intensive purposes, are sitting on their hands by voting down the $700B bailout package in the House today. In response the stock market had it’s worst day in history in points lost and it’s worst percentage drop since 1987. All of this following on the heels of the beating Wall Street has suffered since September 18th.
We are witnessing a colossal tragedy unfolding if it continues. What is occurring in Washington, alongside an angry populace fuming at the “greed” of Wall Street, is the equivalent of driving a car with your eyes closed down a winding mountain road. There is a confluence of forces playing their part in this Shakespearean tragedy, none of which are constructive to our future economic health.
I expect when our elected officials to cast their vote on any bill, especially a bill that of such critical importance, to decide based on the merits of the bill. Any other factors that enter into the decision making process are unacceptable. Yet, today some House Republicans blamed “blamed Ms. Pelosi for a speech before the vote that disdained President Bush’s economic policies, and did so, in the opinion of the speaker’s critics, in too partisan a way,” to explain their nay votes. Republican Jeb Hensarling said the bailout package would the nation on “the slippery slope to socialism,” and added that saddle taxpayers with “the mother of all debt.”
Democrats of course fingered Republicans in the typical partisan merry-go-round that has become standard practice. In the end, all Washington accomplished today was politicizing the most important event of a generation.
Understanding why the vote became politicized is so perfectly simple, yet infuriatingly frustrating. All it requires is a look at the vote roll. Another reason opponents of the bailout package gave for voting no was that they had “encountered too much hostility for the bill among their constituents, and were worried that a vote in favor would be political suicide.” Not surprisingly, in an election year, political suicide can be onset by taking action that might jeopardize your reelection. Don’t rattle the cage too much. People might get scared.
I came across the Robot Pirate Ninja blog today which had an interesting article on this very topic. The post linked to FiveThirtyEight were political suicide is explained in the most simpliest of terms. 38 incumbent Congressman who are in tightly contested races voted on the bailout package. Only 8 of the 30 voted in favor. That’s a .211 average. Of those not in a contested election race, 197 voted for and 198 voted against. Almost a 50/50 split. Is this just a statistical anamoly or did 30 elected Representatives decide their vote on what’s best for keeping them in Washington? I’ll take the former and run with it.
Following the introduction of the bailout package by President Bush, a Gallup poll showed 78% of American’s supported some form of bailout package. But only 22% of voters favored Bush’s proposal while 56% favored a different plan other then Bush’s. Clearly, most American’s favor some form of a bailout package.
I contend that the 56% of voters who favored something other then the proposed plan responded on their deep distrust of Bush(note his 22% rating in polls), and a backlash reaction to the idea of using tax payer dollars to rescue Wall Street. Bush sits as a lame duck President with an unbearable approval rating. Any proposal he makes is going to be met with such ferocious backlash it’s destined to fight an uphill battle. That hill has about a 78% incline.
Combine that with a misconception among the populace that the $700B in taxpayer money is going straight into the pockets of corrupt, greed driven corporations, it creates an irrational fear that the bailout package is the epitome of Wall Street excess and irresponsibility. It’s an emotional reaction, and these types of reactions incite a disregard for analysis. Logic bows in the face of feverish passion. I have read so many blogs that are a mouthpiece for a blinding rage pointed at Wall Street. I’ve talked to many people who ardently contend that they should not be spending their dollars to save money hungry con artists. The bailout package has become something deeply personal for many people.
Times of crisis are one of the few times our elected officials start taking the pulse of their constituents. They have almost assuredly taken note of the wrath that’s resonating throughout our country. They are certainly not going to poke an angry bear. It just might bite.
Some of this would be alleviated by an American populace that viewed the bailout with less theatrics and with more understanding of the economic implication in having a massive bank failure in this country. What we face is not a singular, isolated event. There is a cascade of dominos that follow if we allow banks to crumple.
Banks holding trillions of dollars in illiquid assets amass massive debt. Without capitol reserves, banks drastically reduce corporate loans. Corporate entities unable to raise needed capitol investment scale back their production. The supply and demand equilibrium becomes unbalanced and price delfation sets in. Existing assets lose their value sending businesses scrambling to stabilize their capitol reserves. Lacking necessary capitol reserves and unable to sustain operations, some businesses shut down completely. Existing business hoard capitol reserves and make severe cut backs. The unemployment rate spikes upwards. Lost home income translates into a plummet in consumer spending. Supply and demand ratios become more imbalanced and deflation continues. With reduced loans, banks start calling in their loans. Borrowers, already struggling to meet their own capitol needs, default further reducing existing banks ability to lend. Squeezed with minimal capitol reserves and debt either are unable to pay their loans. A further string of bank closing occur.
The vicious cycle that unfolds goes on and on. This sort of cycle has taken place once before in this country and that was the Great Depression. Understand that bailing out the financial institutions that are now treading water is to put a stop to the falling domino’s – to stop this country from experiencing a massive bank failure and the subsequent evaporation of the necessary capitol to keep the economy functioning. $700B is a small amount of money to potentially to minimize a catastrophic risk.
Handcuffed by political preservation, the gears have ground to a halt. Let us all hope that there are enough of our elected officials in Washington who aren’t driven by partisan politicization, and can hash out a needed bailout package. In the end, I do believe some sort of package will go through. Yes, our tax payer dollar will go to corporate America. And yes, it’s going to save them from running aground. But it’s also going to save our jobs, our health insurance, and our retirement benefits.
This isn’t the first time the government has had to save the free market. It happened once before but not before plenty of foot dragging. In if helps, last time this happened the government came out recouping our tax dollars and then some.
The Rolaid Bills
Buffalo sports fan are lovable losers. We’re perpetual pessimists scorned by a history of failure. Our expectations never fail to account for the worst possible outcome. Every dramatic moment our teams have been a part of invariably end with us being on the short end of the stick. “Wide Right” and “No Goal” are part of our sports lexicon.
So after two straight dramatic come from behind victories, I sat down Sunday to start that football watching ritual with trepidation, fully expecting the worst. And when, after trailing yet again, after three quarters, I was cursing and yelling at the Buffalo Bills as if my deriding comments would somehow spur on another comeback victory.
And once again the Buffalo Bills didn’t fulfill their fans prophecy, mounting another victory earned in the last quarter of play. Not quite as dramatic as the last two, but making a game versus an overmatched opponent wasn’t helping my sports indigestion.
The last three weeks haven’t been the self fulfilling prophecy I’ve become accustomed too – the Bills will make a turn and lead me down the path of disappointment. As much as I want to criticize the play of Jason Peters as not being in Pro Bowl form, I’ve been left with a different feeling three weeks in a row now.
I can’t escape the feeling that I’m watching Trent Edwards mature into an NFL superstar. With only 13 starts under his belt and four comeback wins already, it begs the question – how much better can this kid from Stanford get? The answer my Buffalo sports pessimism wants to give isn’t materializing. Instead, this strange sense of hope and anticipation keeps getting in the way.
Now, it’s on to week 5 with the Bills taking an undefeated record into Arizona to battle the favored Cardinals. I’ll be cheering on my team but this time focusing on everything that could be, and not dangling over a precipice waiting for that twig I’m clinging to to snap. I’ll still have a roll of Rolaids by my side just in case though.
Financial Risk Management: The Problem With Applying Statistical Models To A Random System
Having digested more then my fair share of reasons behind the market crash from television to radio to print to the blogosphere, I’ve been saturated by the common theme of corporate greed and corruption. I don’t buy it as anything other then a compulsory and secondary component to a free market economy. This is, of course, beyond obvious.
Add to the equation profitable longevity, and the greed/corruption arguement becomes less credible. If I gave you the option of taking $5000 right now or $1000 for the next ten years which option would you take? Profitable longevity is not a difficult concept to understand, yet it seems lost on the relentless pounding being doled out on anyone remotely associated with the market crash – market traders, business executives, and government officials.
While there are certainly businesses that run counter to profitable longevity, i.e. Enron, this is not an isolated incident of a single lending institution engaging in suicidal greed. The problem spans entire business sectors including lending institutions and trading firms. From a logical perspective, it’s difficult to assume that two entire business sectors concurrently decided to knowingly engage in practices fueled by excess at the cost of self-destruction.
The need to balance profit and longevity within the financial sector following the Great Depression, the concept of stock and bond risk management was born. By the 1950s, financial risk management evolved from a concept into a full fledged theory centered around mathematical diversification. A decade later risk management theory adopted stochastic calculus in order to better account for the inherent randomness involved in stock trading. Today the financial corporations are littered with what are known as quantitative analysts, otherwise known as quants.
The role of a quant is to develop sophisiticated mathematical and statistical models designed to simulate stochastic processes and it’s potential impact against illiquid products. Uneffected by supply-and-demand price fluctuations, illiquid asset management depends entirely on these quant models to determine value. Another tool employed by quants is the process of statistical arbitrage that relies on quantitative data mining in order to determine the expected value of an asset. These two quant instruments are the foundation for the risk management techniques finicial corporations employ today.
Stochastic calculus attempts to deal with multiple outcomes and given an array of possible initial values, marks the possible outcomes for multiple initial conditions. While it accounts for a wide possibility of paths, it determines which paths are more probable and which ones are more improbable based on the probability of the initial conditions being present(whose sheer numbers can be exponentially mindnumbing). Statistical arbitrage relies heavily on gathering statistics over time, in order to create a computational value based on the expected outcome where multiple outcomes exist.
These two systems are attempting to deal with and account for rogue events. It is in trying to deal with events which have never occurred previously that a fundamental flaw becomes apparent. These two systems, particularly statistical arbitrage, relies almost exclusively on the collection of event data. These statistical models derive their accuracy from the amount of data collected. Hence, the more finite a time data is mined, the less accurate the model becomes. In order for either of these models to be bulletproof, it would require an infinite amount of time to aggregate data.
Here we have two systems employed by the financial sector to determine the improbability of events and conditions which have never occurred. The problem exacerbates itself when you consider how the data that is amassed is disseminated.
In order to map these probable and improbable events, statistical analysis employs the use of the Gaussian curve. It’s a bell curved shaped graph illustrating the probability density of all potential values. The Gaussian curve bends downwards at it’s edges towards improbable events and upwards towards the probable. The width of the curve correlates to the weight of those probable events against those improbable ones. Basically, it charts the normal distribution for events, and giving an indication of which events are more probable then others.
The Gaussian curve is essentially a median value for all possible events. And that is where it fails. A model cannot really account for and give the proper value to a rogue event, the most improbable of occurrences, when it gives greater value to standard, the most probable of events. It fails in calculating the impact of heavy swings against the normal distribution value. A singular, yet improbable event, will hardly impact the height or width of the curve against the statistical weight of a multitude of those that are likely.
To better illustrate this take 100 middle class American households, and calculate the average income. Now put every name of every adult in the United States, and put them in a hat. Randomly draw one name from the hat. Now take that persons household income and recalculate our income average. 99% of the time you would have selected someone close to the median US household income of $40k. The average will not make an appreciable movement upwards or downwards. You could have selected the poorest household in America and the number would hardly have budged. Let’s say you draw from the hat again, but this time you pick out someone in the top 1% income bracket out of the hat with an improbability factor of 298,128,548 to 1. Recalculate the average again. A massive swing upwards in the average will occur. An event that has a 0.01% chance of occurring will appreciable change our end value, where as 99.99% of possible events will not.
One singular, blip on the Gaussian curve can drastically effect our end value. But the curve itself doesn’t properly adjust for that highly improbable, rogue event. Combine this massive swing due to random events with quant statistical models that are ineffectual in mapping these Gaussian blips, and you can begin to see where the problem might lie.
Let’s throw these inadequate models in bed with profit longevity, and it becomes a sticky situation. Financial corporations have a tricky balancing act to perform. Faced with reams of data pointing at the normal distribution of the Gaussian curve coupled with the blind spots for events which have never occurred in stochastic calculus and statistical arbitrage, conclusions have to be made as to which path to follow.
Taking the path of improbability would severely limit potential profits. Under performing profit margins threat longevity. Following the road towards the probable, gives some assurance in profits and promotes company longevity. The decision making process cannot even account for rogue events which the statistical models fail in forecasting.
The historical housing market rise and fall would, at it’s very least, qualify, as an most improbable event. A case could be made that it was a rogue event incapable of being calculated by the quants models. Instead of tossing around the idea that corporate greed was at the center of the economic crisis our country now faces, let’s consider that, at best, the financial sector was presented with misrepresented data by a fundamentally flawed model. And, at worst, their models simply were not able to account for never before seen event chain.
Either way, the quant risk management system might be to blame, and desperately needs to be reexamined to better account for those improbably catastrophic occurrences. No amount of money infusion will turn failing statistical financial models into pinpoint accurate prediction machines – if that’s even possible. Or maybe we should just learn to accept certain levels of risk that randomness carries with it rather then constantly acquiescing to the fat cat blame game.


